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Abstract
The Basel II/III and CRD-IV Accords reduce capital charges on bank loans to smaller firms
by assuming that the default probabilities of smaller firms are less sensitive to macroeconomic
cycles. We test this assumption in a default intensity framework using a large sample of bank
loans to private Danish firms. We find that controlling only for size, the default probabilities
of small firms are, in fact, less cyclical than the default probabilities of large firms. However,
accounting for firm characteristics other than size, we find that the default probabilities of
small firms are equally cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probabilities of large
firms. These results hold using a multiplicative Cox model as well as an additive Aalen model
with time-varying coefficients.
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1 Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) typically depend more heavily on funding from banks
than do larger firms. It is therefore conceivable that SMEs are hit harder during a financial crisis
in which banks’ capital constraints are binding. As a way to facilitate bank funding of SMEs, the
Basel II Accord prescribes lower capital charges for loans to the SME-segment. Technically, the
reduction in capital charges is implemented by prescribing a lower asset correlation to be used
when calculating capital charges. To the extent that asset correlation arises because of common
dependence on macroeconomic shocks, the reduction corresponds to assuming that the default
probabilities of SMEs are less sensitive to macroeconomic cycles than those of larger firms. These
reductions in capital charges were recently reaffirmed and extended in the Basel III Accord and in
the fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD-IV).1
This paper uses a large sample of loans to private Danish firms to test whether there is empirical
support for the assumption that the default probabilities of smaller firms are less cyclical. Our
results indicate that solely discriminating with respect to firm-size, the default probabilities of
small firms are in fact less sensitive to macroeconomic cycles compared to the default probabilities
of large firms. However, when we account for differences in firm-characteristics other than size, our
results indicate that the default probabilities of small firms are as cyclical or even more cyclical
than the default probabilities of large firms. This indicates that the size effect arises because of
omitted variables. These results are robust to different regression models and different ways of
dividing our sample into small and large firms. The evidence form our data suggests that a bank
that properly accounts for firm characteristics in its default risk modeling will not experience a
weaker effect of economic cycles in the SME segmemt, and hence the reduced capital charge will
in fact make a bank with a high exposure to the SME-segment more risky.
According to the European Commission’s (2016) annual report, SMEs comprised over 99% of
all enterprises, accounted for 67% of total employment, and stood for over 70% of job growth in the
non-financial business sector in the 28 EU countries. Hence their importance for the economy pro-
vides a political justification for the separate treatment. Furthermore, shifting banks’ risk-exposure
towards smaller firms could be in the interest of regulators—for instance because larger firms are
more likely to have larger loans or loans across several banks, which could create contagion within
and across banks in case of defaults. But such effects are already accounted for using so-called
1Article 273 of The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (2006) report states the following: “Under the
IRB approach for corporate credits, banks will be permitted to separately distinguish exposures to SME borrowers
(defined as corporate exposures where the reported sales for the consolidated group of which the firm is a part is less
than e50 million) from those to large firms. A firm-size adjustment [...] is made to the corporate risk weight formula
for exposures to SME borrowers.”
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‘granularity adjustments’. Our focus is on whether an additional adjustment of capital charges
through lower correlation with the macroeconomic environment can be justified empirically.
Our data covers the period 2003-2012 and consists of obligor, loan, and default information for
a large sample of private Danish firms. We devise two different ways of testing whether defaults
of smaller firms are more or less cyclical. First, we use the standard multiplicative Cox regression
model to estimate the effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables on default intensities.
Our Cox models confirm previous findings that accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables
play distinct roles in default prediction for private firms: (1) Accounting ratios are necessary for
accurately ranking private firms according to default likelihood, but cannot by themselves capture
the cyclicality of aggregate default rates, while (2) macroeconomic variables are indispensable for
capturing the cyclicality of aggregate default rates, but do not aid in the ranking of firms with
respect to default likelihood. Using our fitted Cox model, we find that when we split our sample
with respect to firm size and keep all other firm characteristics fixed, the default probabilities of
smaller firms do in fact exhibit less sensitivity to macroeconomic cycles. This is in the sense
that the effects of macroeconomic variables are generally of smaller magnitude for smaller firms.
However, when we account for the Cox model’s non-linear form and use averaging techniques
adapted from other non-linear regression models, our results indicate that the default probability
of the average small firm may be as cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probability of
the average large firm.
Second, we investigate our data using the more flexible additive Aalen regression model. The
additive model allows us to estimate time-varying effects of firm-specific variables, which is a
potentially important component of the cyclicality of default probabilities that is missing from our
Cox model. Furthermore, due to the linearity of its effects, the additive model allows us to directly
compare the effects of macroeconomic variables for small and large firms without the need for
averaging techniques. Our analysis based on the additive model reveals, in particular, that firm-size
has a significantly time-varying and mostly negative effect. Hence, the effect of firm-size varies
significantly the with business-cycle but is generally such that that larger firms have lower default
probabilities. Moreover, the effect of firm-size reaches its largest (negative) magnitude during the
financial crisis of ‘08-‘10, which indicates that larger firms were safer, not riskier, during the most
recent recession. Lastly, using our fitted additive model and splitting the sample with respect to firm
size, we again find no evidence that there is a difference in the signs, magnitudes, or significance of
the effects of our macroeconomic variables for small firms compared to large firms. These results
indicate that our main findings are robust to different regression models that capture cyclicality in
different ways.
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Our results indicate that a different treatment of capital charges solely based on firm-size is too
simplistic, as it ignores other important characteristics that differ between small and large firms.
This suggests that imposing solely size-based preferential treatment of capital charges may, in fact,
increase the risks of banks with a high exposure to the SME-segment.
The outline of of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the piece of the Basel regulation
that motivates our study. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 details our data and variable se-
lection. Section 5 provides our estimation methodology. Section 6 presents our regression results
for identifying the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables that significantly predict defaults.
Section 6 presents our results regarding the sensitivity of small and large firms’ default probabili-
ties to macroeconomic variables. Section 7 shows results related to robustness and model check.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Basel capital charge for loans
Basel II and III allow banks to estimate capital requirements for small and medium-sized corpo-
rations (SMEs) using a risk weight formula that includes a lower asset correlation with macroe-
conomic risk-drivers compared to that of larger corporations. The exact formulation in Basel II
can be found in Articles 273 and 274 of The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (2006)
report. The same provisions are carried forward and extended in the Basel III Accord and the re-
cently adopted CRD-IV as Articles 153.4 and 501.1 of The European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union’s (2013) report.
The amount of equity capital required for funding a loan essentially depends on the unexpected
loss (UL) per unit principal,
UL = LGD(θ∗ − PD),
where PD is the loan’s one-year probability of default, LGD is the loss rate given default, and
θ∗ = Φ
 1√
1 − ρ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
ρΦ−1(0.999)
) . (1)
Here, Φ is the standard normal distribution function and θ∗ is the 99.9% worst case default rate.
The correlation parameter, ρ, that goes into this calculation is PD-dependent and prescribed by the
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Basel documentation (after removing the negligible terms exp(−50)) as
ρ(PD) = 0.12
(
1 − exp(−50 PD)) + 0.24 exp(−50 PD).
For SMEs with annual sales, S , up to e50 million, this correlation is modified to
ρ(PD) = 0.12
(
1 − exp(−50 PD)) + 0.24 exp(−50 PD) − 0.04 (1 − max(S − 5; 0)
45
)
,
where the last term has the effect of lowering the capital requirement. The exact capital requirement
depends on the contribution to Risk Weighted Assets (RWA), which depends on UL, the Exposure-
at-Default (EAD), and a maturity adjustment whose exact form need not concern us here.
As an illustration of the economic magnitude of the reduction in capital requirement for SMEs,
note that with an annual default probability of 1%, a loan to an SME with S =e25 million achieves
a deduction in asset correlation of 11.52% relative to an equally risky non-SME. Assuming an LGD
of 15% and an effective maturity of 2.5 years (both provided as “representative averages” by the
financial institution that provided us with the data), we calculate that this corresponds to deduction
of 12.14% in capital requirement.
In the derivation of the capital charge formula, ρ represents correlation between asset values of
different borrowers which arises because the asset values depend on a common economy-wide fac-
tor. Therefore, the reduction in correlation for SMEs corresponds to an assumption that these firms
have default probabilities that are less sensitive to the economy-wide factor. It is this assumption
that we will devise two ways of testing on a large Danish data set.
3 Related literature
There is conflicting evidence in the literature regarding the validity of the assumption in the Basel
Accords that the default probabilities of smaller firms are less cyclical. Lopez (2004) employs
the KMV approach on a sample of US, Japanese, and European firms and finds that average asset
correlation is a decreasing function of probability of default and an increasing function of firm-
size, which is line with the assumption in the Basel Accords. Dietsch and Petey (2004), however,
use a one-factor credit risk model on a sample of French and German firms and find that SMEs
have higher default risk than larger firms and that the asset correlations for SMEs are weak and
decrease with firm-size. Chionsini, Marcucci, and Quagliariello (2010) use firm-size dependent
linear regression of default probabilities on macroeconomic time-series for a sample of Italian
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firms and they find support for the size-dependent treatment in the Basel Accord, though not during
severe financial crises like that of 2008-09. Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2005) use a Monte-
Carlo resampling method for a sample of Swedish firms and find little support for the hypothesis
that SME loan portfolios are less risky, or require less economic capital, than corporate loans.
Our approach differs from these studies in that we use an intensity regression framework to
directly estimate and study how default probabilities simultaneously depend on a large set of firm-
characteristics, including size, as well as macroeconomic variables. This allows us to determine
the firm-characteristics that are important for accurately ranking firms with respect to default like-
lihood as well as the macroeconomic variables important for capturing the cyclicality of default
rates over time. Importantly, our approach has the advantage of allowing us to directly deter-
mine how the effects of macroeconomic variables on default probabilities differ for small and large
firms while simultaneously controlling for firm-characteristics other than size. We apply averaging
techniques to the Cox regression model resembling those commonly applied to generalized linear
models—see, for instance, Wooldridge (2009, p. 582-83) for an overview. The additive regression
model due to Aalen (1980, 1989), was applied in a default prediction setting by Lando, Medhat,
Nielsen, and Nielsen (2013). They show that there is significant time-variation in how certain
firm-specific variables influence the default probabilities of public US firms.
Statistical models using accounting ratios to estimate default probabilities date back to at least
Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), followed by Ohlsen (1980) and Zmijewski (1984)—we use
many of the same accounting ratios as in these studies. Shumway (2001) was among the first to
demonstrate the advantages of intensity models with time-varying covariates compared to tradi-
tional discriminant analysis, and was also among the first to include equity return as a market-
based predictor of default probabilities—we use a similar estimation setup, although we do not
have market-based variables for our private firms. Chava and Jarrow (2004) improved the setup
of Shumway (2001) using covariates measured at the monthly level and showed the importance of
industry effects—our data frequency is also at the monthly level and we correct for industry effects
in all our regressions.
Structural models of credit risk, like the models of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974),
and Leland (1994), usually assume that a firm defaults when its assets drop to a sufficiently low
level relative to its liabilities. The connection between structural models and intensity models was
formally established by Duffie and Lando (2001), who showed that when the firm’s asset value
process is not perfectly observable, a firm’s default time has a default intensity that depends on the
firm’s observable characteristics as well as other covariates. Studies demonstrating the importance
of covariates implied from structural models, like distance-to-default or asset volatility, include
6
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bank recorded the first interaction with the client. Entry year specifies the year at which the firm 
enters the sample while duration is the number of years a firm is observed in the sample since its 
entry year. 
From the onset of the analysis a larger stock of firms exist in the sample in 2003 and an inflow of 
new firms to the sample happens in the following years. Figure 6 (a) shows the numbers of firms 
entering the sample each year. Despite discussions with Danske Bank, the low number of firms 
entering the sample in 2005 cannot be explained. It appears however, by the black line, that the 
firms that eventually default do not seems to differ systematically from the non-defaulting firms 
based on when they enter the sample. While the 2005 entry levels remains a conundrum, the 
similarity in default and non-defaulting firms’ entry patterns is taken to imply that the independent 
censoring assumption is not violated based on entry year. 
Figure 6: Examining entry year and risk set 
 (a)          (b) 
 
 
Figure 6 (b) shows on the left vertical axis, the risk set which is the number of firms which are 
observed in a given quarter and therefore potentially at risk of default. On the right hand side is the 
quarterly number of defaults. As firms continuously enter and leave the data-set the sample size 
varies over time. What is remarkable is the approximately 2000 firm drop in the risk set from 2004 
to 2005 which cannot be explained by the only 22 defaults in 2004:Q4. A large number of firms are 
simply lost to follow-up, while, as noted, very few firms enter the sample this year. 
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Notes: Figure 6 (a) shows yearly number of entering firms based categorized by firm eventually default or non-default. 
Figure 6 (b) shows the quarterly number of observed defaults in the sample along with the number of firms in the risk set 
Figure 1. Entry and at-risk pattern in the sample. The left panel shows the yearly number of firms entering the
sample (grey mass) along with the yearly number of entries that do not default (black, solid line) or eventually do
default (black, dashed line). The right panel shows the quarterly number of firms at risk of defaulting (i.e. in the “risk
set”; grey mass) along with the actual number of defaulting firms in each quarter (black, solid line).
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Lando and Nielsen (2010), and
Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011) among many others.
Default studies using data on public firms and demonstrating the importance of employing
macroeconomic variables include McDonald and de G cht (1999), Peseran, Schuermann, Treut-
ler, and Weiner (2006), Duffie et al. (2007), Lando and Nielsen (2010), Figlewski, Frydman, and
Liang (2012), among many others. Recent default studies of private firms that also employ macroe-
conomic variables include Carling, Jacobson, Linde´, and Roszbach (2007), who use Swedish data,
and Bonfim (2009), who uses Portuguese data. We employ many of the same macroeconomic
variables as in these studies.
4 Data and variables
This section presents our data and the variables that we employ as firm-specific and macroeco-
nomic drivers of default probabilities.
Our raw data comprises 28,395 firms and 114,409 firm-year observations of obligor and loan
histories, accounting statements, and default indicators over the period 2003 to 2012. The data
is obtained from a large Danish A-IRB (advanced internal ratings-based approach) financial insti-
tution. A firm is included in this dataset if it has an engagement over DKK 2 million in at least
one of the years underlying the period of analysis. An engagement is defined in terms of loans or
granted credit lines. After removing sole proprietorships, government institutions, holding compa-
nies without consolidated financial statements, firms that do not have Denmark as their residency,
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Figure 2. Default rates in the sample and the general Danish economy. The left panel shows the quarterly default
rate from the sample along with the corresponding aggregate number of quarterly bankruptcies in the general Danish
economy. The right panel shows the yearly default rate from the sample along with the aggregate quarterly number of
default in the general Danish economy.
and firms with insufficient balance sheet information, we are left with 10,671 firms and 48,703
firm-year observations. In the cleaned dataset, a total of 633 firms experienced a default event,
defined by the Basel II Accord as more than 90 days delinquency. Moreover, 54 of the 633 de-
faulting firms experience a second default, in the sense that they became delinquent a second time
during the sample period. Other default studies have treated a firm that re-emerges from default as
a new firm. In accordance with the Basel II Accord’s definition of a default event as a period of
delinquency, we choose to disregard multiple default events, so that only the initial default counts.
Figure 1 shows the patterns by which firms enter and potentially leave our final sample. The
right panel shows the number of firms that enter the sample at each year along with an indication of
the number of entries eventually corresponding to defaults and non-defaults. Despite discussions
with the financial institution providing the data, the low number of firms entering the sample in
2005 remains a conundrum. It appears, however, that the firms that eventually default do not seem
to differ systematically from the non-defaulting firms based on when they enter the sample. The
right panel shows the number of firms at risk of defaulting, i.e. firms in the “risk set,” at each
quarter, along with the quarterly number of defaults. The risk set is seen to contain at least 2,000
firms at each quarter, and the 2008-09 financial crisis is readily visible from the sharp rise in the
number of defaults.
In order to incorporate quarterly macroeconomic variables, we re-code the accounting variables
for each firm from annual to quarterly observations. This will naturally induce persistence in
the accounting variables from quarter to quarter, which we correct for by basing all inference on
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standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The final dataset thus consists of a total of 192,196
firm-quarter observations.
Figure 2 compares the observed default rate in our sample to the number of registered bankrupt-
cies in Denmark. The comparison is feasible because the total number of firms at risk of default
in Denmark is relatively stable over time. We see that, due to the relatively few incidences, the
default rate in the sample co-moves nicely with the aggregate level in Denmark. This indicates that
our results are not likely to be representative for all Danish SMEs.
4.1 Firm-specific explanatory variables
Table 1 provides an overview of the firm-specific explanatory variables which we employ in our
regression analysis. Our firm-specific explanatory variables measure size, age, leverage, profitabil-
ity, asset liquidity, collateralization, and (book) equity. The table also gives the accounting ratios
which we use to proxy for the firm-specific explanatory variables along with the expected sign of
each accounting-based variable’s effect on default probabilities. All our accounting-based vari-
ables have been applied in previous default studies, and the expected signs of their effects are both
intuitive and well-discussed in the literature—see, for instance, Ohlsen (1980), Shumway (2001),
Duffie et al. (2007), and Lando and Nielsen (2010). We also correct for industry effects as in Chava
and Jarrow (2004). The main difference between our list of firm-specific variables and the ones
used in default studies of public firms is the lack of market-based measures like stock return and
distance-to-default.
We control for industry effects since certain industry characteristics may prescribe a certain
leverage structure, for example because of differences in the volatility of cash flows. We use the
sector affiliation by Statistics Denmark to identify a firm’s primary industry as either “Construc-
tion,” “Manufacturing,” or “Wholesale and Retail,” as these have above average default rates, but
are at the same time coarse enough to ensure a sufficient number of firms in each sector.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our firm-specific explanatory variables. An analysis of
the variables revealed a few miscodings and extreme values. Due to the anonymized nature of the
data, we were not able to check the validity of these data points manually, and we therefore choose
to winsorize all the firm-specific variables at the 1st and 99th percentile—a practice also used by
Chava and Jarrow (2004), Shumway (2001), and Bonfim (2009), among others. The average firm
has DKK 275 million in assets, a total debt to total assets ratio of 68%, and interest payments
corresponding to 3% of total assets. Further, the average firm had a relationship with the bank for
23 years and remains in the sample for 7 out of the 9 years.
Due to Danish reporting standards, firms below a certain size may refrain from reporting rev-
9
Table 1. Firm-specific explanatory variables and corresponding, observable accounting-based variables. The
left column shows our list of firm-specific explanatory variables, the center column shows the observable accounting-
based variables which we use as proxies, and the right column shows the expected effect of each accounting-based
variables on default probabilities. Industry Effects are included in the list for completeness, although we only use this
variable as a control (see details in the text).
Probability of default and the macroeconomy Thais Lærkholm Jensen 
Page | 15  
 
2.1 Internal explanatory variables 
Due to the rich data set provided by Danske Bank, a number of firm specific accountancy variables 
have been investigated. While macroeconomic variables may facilitate a good view of the aggregate 
level of defaults in an economy, it is ultimately the financial situation of a firm that is determining 
whether or not a firm becomes delinquent. The microstructure also facilities a deeper understanding 
of which segments within a sample that are particularly affected by the macroeconomic variables. 
Also, it enables the credit institution to perform an ordinal ranking and assess which firms are more 
likely to default.  
Table 2 provides an overview of internal explanatory variables that will be examined in turn below. 
In addition to the explanatory variables, the measurement used to capture the variables is also listed 
along with the expected effect on the probability of default. Sources and definitions of the 
measurements are given in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2: Internal variables and their expected effect on default probability 
Explanatory Variable Investigated Measurements Expected effect on probability of default 
Size Log of book value of assets Negative 
Age Years active in the bank Negative 
Leverage 
Short term debt to total assets Positive 
Total debt to total assets Positive 
Interest bearing debt to total assets Positive 
Interest payments to total assets Positive 
Profitability 
Net income to total assets Negative  
EBIT to total assets Negative 
EBITDA to total assets Negative 
Liquidity Current ratio Negative 
Quick ratio  Negative 
Collateralization Fixed assets to total assets Negative 
PPE to total assets Negative 
Negative equity Dummy for negative equity Positive 
Industry Effects DB07 Sector affiliation Control variable 
Notes: Sources and definitions of measurements are given in appendix 1. All variables are in the estimation lagged one year to 
allow for prediction of default. 
  
Proxy
enue and employee count, and hence these variables are zero (or missing) for a large proportion of
firms in the sample. We therefore choose not to use these two variables in our further analysis in
order to retain a large sample of smaller firms. In Table 2, firm age is taken to be time since the
bank recorded the first interaction with the client, entry year specifies the year at which the firm
enters the sample, and duration is the number of years a firm is observed in the sample since its
entry year. The negative (book) equity dummy has an unconditional mean of 0.063, meaning that
just over 6% of our firm-quarters show a negative value of (book) equity.
4.2 Macroeconomic explanatory variables
Table 3 provides an overview of the macroeconomic explanatory variables which we employ in
our regression analysis. Our macroeconomic explanatory variables cover the stock market, interest
rates, GDP, credit supply, inflation, industrial production, as well as demand for consumer goods.
The table also gives the observable time-series which we use to proxy for the macroeconomic
explanatory variables along with the expected sign of each time-serie’s effect on default probabil-
10
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the firm-specific variables. The table shows descriptive statistics for the firm-
specific variables of the cleaned sample, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The total number of observations is
192,196 firm-quaters. Age is time since the bank recorded the first interaction with the client. Entry is the year where
the firm entered the sample. Duration is the number of years the firm remains in the sample. All other variable have
standard interpretations.
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percentiale recpectively. Unfortunately the data from Danske Bank includes miscodings14 and due 
to the anonymization of the data it has been infeasible to check any of these recordings manually. 
As a result, the approach taken here has also been to winsorize the data at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
The winsororized summary statistics are presented in Table 6 while Appendix 8 presents summary 
statitistics by default status.15 
The average firm has DKK 275 million assets, a ratio of 68% between total debt to total assets and 
interest payments corresponding to 3% of total assets. Furthermore the average firm had a 
relationship with the bank for 23 years and remains in the sample for 7 out of the 9 years. 
Table 6: Summary statistics for the cleaned data 
Variable Mean Std 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 
Total assets (tDKK) 275.074 1.060.373 811 2.784 9.553 28.222 100.723 1.025.875 8.656.000
Revenue (tDKK) 242.031 885.431 0 0 0 0 70.925 1.097.486 6.733.409
Employees 113 348 0 0 1 18 64 484 2.666
Age (years) 23 20 1 3 9 18 30 71 97,25
Log(total assets) (tDKK) 10,46 1,81 6,70 7,93 9,16 10,25 11,52 13,84 15,97
Short term debt to total assets 0,51 0,28 0,01 0,09 0,30 0,49 0,69 0,96 1,58
Total debt to total assets 0,68 0,28 0,02 0,18 0,53 0,70 0,84 1,04 1,80
Interestbearing debt to total assets 0,39 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,37 0,56 0,87 1,38
Interest payments to total assets 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,17
Current ratio 1,66 2,42 0,03 0,28 0,88 1,17 1,59 3,80 20,21
Quick ratio 1,28 2,37 0,02 0,14 0,49 0,81 1,19 3,15 19,67
Fixed assets to total assets 0,40 0,29 0,00 0,01 0,14 0,36 0,63 0,93 0,99
Tangible Assets to total assets 0,30 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,23 0,49 0,87 0,97
Net Income to total assets 0,03 0,14 -0,68 -0,18 0,00 0,03 0,09 0,24 0,43
EBIT to total assets 0,06 0,15 -0,59 -0,16 0,00 0,05 0,12 0,29 0,51
EBITDA to total assets 0,10 0,15 -0,51 -0,12 0,02 0,09 0,17 0,34 0,54
Entry Year 2005 1,94 2003 2003 2003 2004 2006 2009 2010
Duration (Years) 7 2 1 2 5 7 9 9 9
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics for the cleaned sample winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile with 192.196 observations 
in total. Age is taken to be time since the bank recorded the first interaction with the client. Entry is the year when the firm entered 
the sample. Duration is how many years the firm remains in the sample. All other variable have standard interpretation and are 
further described in Appendix 1. 
As shown in Table 6, revenue and employee count takes the value zero for a large proportion of 
observations. This is due to Danish reporting standards that allow firms below a certain size to 
refrain from reporting these numbers. As a result, these two variables are not used for further 
analysis in order not to discriminate against the smaller firms. Age is taken to be time since the 
                                                     
14 E.g. one firm was recorded as having 1.3 million employees while the largets company in Denmark employs only 
approximately 0.1 million employees. 
15 Appendix 8 also presents summary statistics for the group of firms that leave the sample for other reasons that default. 
ities. The macroeconomic time-series are primarily obtained from Ecowin, with additional data
from Statistics Denmark, OECD, and Stoxx.
The inclusion of lagged macroeconomic vari bles allows us to use these t compute growth
rates, differences, or levels. We select the appropriate form by 1) computing the correlation be-
tween each form of the macroeconomic variable and the observed default rate, and 2) visually
inspecting the relationship of each form with the observed default rate. Note, however, that some
pairs f the macro onomic variables exhibit collin arity—for example, the Danish GDP gr wth
and the European GDP growth rate, as well as the return on the OMX index and the Stoxx index,
have pair-wise correlations of 0,92 and 0,77, respectively. The high degree of collinearity should
be kept in mind when interpreting the estimated regression coefficients in the following sections.
11
Table 3. Macroeconomic explanatory variables and corresponding observable time-series. The left column shows
our list of macroeconomic explanatory variables, the center column shows the macroeconomic time-series which we
use to measure each macroeconomic explanatory variable, and the right column shows the expected effect of each
macroeconomic time-series on default probabilities.
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wide range of models examined. Duffie et al. (2007) surprisingly finds that default intensities 
increase when the trailing one-year return of S&P 500 increases. The explanation given is that this 
might be due to the mean reverting nature of business-cycles.  
Table 4: External variables and their expected effect on default probability 
Explanatory Variable Investigated Measurements Expected effect on probability of default 
Stock return Return of OMX index Negative 
Stock volatility Volatility of OMX index Unknown 
Interest rates Slope of yield curve Negative 
GDP Real growth in Danish GDP Negative 
Loan growth Loan growth to non-financial firms Positive 
Credit availability Funding costs Positive 
Aggregate defaults Danish bankruptcies Positive 
Inflation Headline CPI Unknown 
Demand side effects Consumer confidence Negative 
House prices Negative 
Supply side effects Business indicator, manufacturing Negative 
Capacity utilization Negative 
International exposure 
Exports to Danish GDP Unknown 
Return of Stoxx50 index Negative 
EU 27 GDP growth Negative 
Notes: Sources and definitions of macroeconomic variables are given in Appendix 2. All variables are in the estimation lagged 
one year to allow for prediction of default. 
 
The volatility of equity indices may signal the unrest in the economy, and as consequently higher 
volatility would be expected to be positively correlated with default rates. This is also the 
argumentation of Figlewski, et. al (2012) in their analysis, although their volatility measure 
ultimately turns out to be an insignificant predictor of default.  On the other hand, studying models 
of endogenous defaults, Lando (2004) argues that increasing volatility may also lower the optimal 
default point, making defaults less likely to occur for troubled firms. This discrepancy makes the 
expected effect of volatility unknown. 
The most liquid and closely monitored index in Denmark is the OMX index and is consequently 
adopted for calculating equity volatility and stock returns. One caveat to using the OMX equity 
index for Denmark is however that this index only includes the largest and perhaps most resilient 
firms in Denmark, and consequently might not be adequately capturing how smaller firms are 
impacted by the business cycle.  
Proxy
5 Estimation methodology
This section present the me hodology which we apply to stima e th effects of our explan tory
variables on firm-specific default probabilities.
Suppose we have a sample of n levered firms observed over a time-horizon [0,T ], where firm
i may default at a stochastic time τi. At each time t, the firm’s financial state is determined by a
vector Xit of firm-specific variables and by a vector Zt of macroeconomic variables, with values
common to all firms in the sample. Default at time t occurs with intensity λit = λ(Xit,Zt), meaning
that λit is the conditional mean arrival rate of default for firm i, measured in events per time unit.
Intuitively, this means that, given survival and the observed covariate histories up to time t, firm
i defaults in the short time-interval [t, t + dt) with probability λit dt.2 We assume τi is doubly-
stochastic driven by the combined history of the internal and external covariates (see for instance
Duffie et al., 2007).
We devise two different ways of testing whether defaults of smaller firms are more or le s
2Precisely, a martingale is defined by 1(τi≤t) −
∫ t
0 1(τi>s)λis ds with respect to the filtration generated by the event
(τi > t) and the combined history of the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables up to time t.
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cyclical. First, we use the standard multiplicative Cox regression model to estimate the effects of
firm-specific and macroeconomic variables on default intensities. Second, we use the more flexible
additive Aalen regression model which allows for time-varying effects of firm-specific variables.
5.1 The Cox regression model
In our initial analysis of which accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables that significantly
predict defaults, we specify the firm-specific default intensities using the popular “proportional
hazards” regression model of Cox (1972). The intensity of firm i at time t is thus modeled as
λ(Xit,Zt) = Yit exp
(
β>Xit + γ>Zt
)
,
where Yit is an at-risk-indicator for firm i, taking the value 1 if firm i has not defaulted “just before”
time t and 0 otherwise, while β and γ are vectors of regression coefficients. The effect of a one-unit
increase in the jth internal covariate at time t is to multiply the intensity by the “relative risk” e β j .
The same interpretation applies to the external covariates. We let the first component of the vector
Zt be a constant 1. This means that the first component of γ is a baseline intensity, corresponding
to the (artificial) default intensity of firm i when all observable covariates are identically zero.3
Following, for instance, Andersen, Borgan, Gill, and Keiding (1992), and under the standard
assumptions that late-entry, temporal withdrawal, right-censoring, and covariate distributions are
uninformative on regression coefficients, the (partial) log-likehood for estimation of the vectors β
and γ based on a sample of n firms becomes
l(β,γ) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
β>Xit + γ>Zt
)
dNit −
∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
Yit exp
(
β>Xit + γ>Zt
)
dt,
where Nit = 1(τi≤t) is the the one-jump default counting process for firm i. We investigate the
assumption of independent censoring and entry-pattern in Section 8, and find that our parameter
estimates are robust to the exclusion of firm-years that could potentially induce bias.
Estimation, inference, and model selection for the Cox model may then be based on maximum
likelihood techniques. Given maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of β and γ, we can judge
the influence of covariates on default intensities by judging the significance of the corresponding
regression coefficients, and we can predict firm-specific and aggregate default intensities by plug-
3Note that while the usual Cox model includes an (unspecified) time-varying baseline-intensity, thereby making
it a semi-parametric survival regression model, we cannot simultaneously identify the vector γ of macroeconomic
regression coefficients as well as a time-varying baseline-intensity—we therefore restrict to a fully parametric model
with a constant baseline intensity.
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ging the MLEs back into intensity specification of the Cox model. Model check may be based on
the so-called “martingale residual processes,”
Nit −
∫ t
0
Yis exp
(
β̂
>
Xis + γ̂
>Zs
)
ds, i = 1, . . . , n, t ∈ [0,T ], (2)
which, when the model is correct, converge to mean-zero martingales as the sample size in-
creases. Hence, when aggregated over covariate-quantiles or sectors, the grouped residuals pro-
cesses should not exhibit any systematic trends when plotted as functions of time.
5.2 The Aalen regression model
In addition to the Cox model, we will also employ the additive regression model of Aalen (1980,
1989), which specifies the default intensity of firm i as a linear function of the covariates. This al-
lows us to estimate time-varying effects of firm-specific variables, which is a potentially important
component of the cyclicality of default probabilities that is missing from our Cox models. Further-
more, due to the linearity of its effects, the additive model allows us to directly compare the effects
of macroeconomic variables for small and large firms without the need for averaging techniques,
in contrast to the Cox model.
Our specification of the additive model for the default intensity of firm i is given by
λ(Xit,Zt) = β(t)>Xit + γ>Zt,
where β(t) is a vector of unspecified regression functions of time, while γ is a vector of (time-
constant) regression coefficients.4
The linearity of the additive model allows for estimation of both time-varying and constant
parameters using ordinary least squares-methods. For the time-varying coefficients, the focus is
on the cumulative regression coefficients, B j(t) =
∫ t
0
β j(s) ds, which are easy to estimate non-
parametrically. Further, formal tests of the significance and time-variation of regression functions
is possible through resampling schemes. We refer to Aalen, Borgan, and Gjessing (2008), Marti-
nussen and Scheike (2006), and Lando et al. (2013) for a detailed presentation of estimation and
inference procedures.
4Note that we cannot identify time-varying effects for the macroeconomic variables, as the macroeconomic vari-
ables do not vary across firms at a given point in time.
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6 Default prediction for private firms
In this section, we investigate which accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables that signifi-
cantly predict defaults in our sample. We initially focus on the multiplicative Cox model, before
using the addive Aalen model to judge whether allowing for time-varying effects of firm-specific
variables changes our conclusions.5
First, we show the result from a Cox model using only firm-specific variables. We will see
that this model cannot adequately predict the cyclical variation in the aggregate default rate. Sec-
ond, we add macroeconomic variables to the Cox model and show that this allows the model to
much more accurately predict the aggregate default rate over time. However, when judging the
different Cox models’ ability to correctly rank firms with respect to default likelihood, we will
see that macroeconomic variables only marginally improve the ranking based on accounting ratios
alone. Hence, to the capture cyclicality of default rates, it is sufficient to focus on macroeconomic
variables—however, accounting variables are necessary controls for variations in firm-specific de-
fault risk not related to size. Finally, we estimate an additive Aalen using the same variables as in
our preferred Cox model, but allowing for time-varying effects of the firm-specific variables. We
find significant time-variation in the effects of several firm-specific variables. Furthermore, allow-
ing for this time-variation turns the effects of the macroeconomic variables insignificant. Hence,
time-variation in the effects of firm-specific variables is an important alternative way of quantifying
the cyclicality of default probabilities.
6.1 Using accounting ratios alone
Initially, we fit a Cox model of firm-by-firm default intensities using only firm-specific variables.
We will use this fitted model to examine to what extent macroeconomic variables add additional
explanatory power to default prediction.
Table 4 presents estimation results for Cox models using only firm-specific variables. Due to
the high degree of correlation among the measurements within the same categories, we perform
a stepwise elimination of variables in a given category, removing the least significant variables in
5We focus on both the Cox and the Aalen models because they each have their advantages in the tests we con-
sider. The Cox model has the advantages that it automatically produces nonnegative intensities and that its constant
regression coefficients allow out of sample prediction. The Aalen model has the advantages of time-varying effects
of firm-specific variables and easy comparison of effects across subsamples. Note that while there exist variants of
the Cox model that in principle allow for time-varying effects of firm-specific variables, such variants have to apply
some degree of smoothing in each estimation iteration, which might blur or distort the effects. Such smoothing is not
necessary for estimating time-varying effects in the additive Aalen model. See Martinussen and Scheike (2006), Aalen
et al. (2008), and Lando et al. (2013) for more on the differences between (variants of) the Cox model and the Aalen
model.
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Table 4. Estimation results for Cox models including only accounting ratios. The table shows parameter estimates,
standard errors, and model summary statistics for Cox models of the quarterly default intensity of firms in the sample.
All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. The full list of firm-specific variables are included in
model (1). Models (2) through (4) show the stepwise elimination, keeping only the most significant measure within the
groups of (1) leverage, (2) profitability, (3) liquidity, and (4) collateralization. Model (5) (shaded grey) is the preferred
specification when only firm-specific variables are used as covariates. Significance of parameters is indicated at the
10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Parameter significance is based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level.
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for a correlation matrix of internal variables) the approach has been to perform a stepwise 
elimination of variables in a given category, removing the leas  signific nt variables in each step.18 
The outcome is that for the internal variables in the model, interest bearing debt to total assets, net 
income to total assets, quick ratio and tangible assets (PPE) to total assets remain in the model along 
with age of banking relationship, log of total assets and a negative equity dum y.  
 
                                                     
18 The stepwise elimination is sensitive to the order of category selection. Performing an alternative specification, 
eliminating variables in the order of (1) profitability, (2) leverage, (3) liquidity and (4) collateralization produce similar 
results with the only exception of interest payments to total assets showing up in the final model as opposed to interest 
bearing debt to total asset as in chose specification. 
Table 9: Hazard model using only firm specific variables
Dependent variable: Default (0/1)
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef
Intercept -6,788 *** -6,494 *** -6,668 *** -6,684 *** -6,729 ***
Years active in the bank -0,011 *** -0,011 *** -0,011 *** -0,011 *** -0,011 ***
Log of total assets 0,043 * 0,014 0,020 0,019 0,016
(1) Short term debt to total assets -0,572 **
Total debt to total assets 0,644 **
Interest bearing debt to total assets 0,661 *** 1,226 *** 1,262 *** 1,261 *** 1,255 ***
Interest payments to total assets 7,843 ***
(2) Net income to total assets -0,961 ** -1,790 *** -2,012 *** -2,025 *** -2,015 ***
EBIT to total assets 1,403 * 1,963 **
EBITDA to total assets -2,615 *** -2,514 ***
(3) Quick Ratio -0,078 -0,045 -0,057 -0,212 ** -0,202 **
Current ratio -0,192 -0,179 -0,161
(4) Fixed assets to total assets -0,455 -0,288 -0,308 -0,280
PPE to total assets 0,529 ** 0,571 ** 0,473 ** 0,466 ** 0,255
Negative equity, dummy 0,467 ** 0,547 *** 0,555 *** 0,563 *** 0,570 ***
Construction, dummy 0,926 *** 0,885 *** 0,928 *** 0,921 *** 0,951 ***
Wholesale and retail trade, dummy 0,214 0,216 * 0,267 ** 0,250 * 0,275 **
Manufacturing, dummy 0,404 *** 0,399 *** 0,420 *** 0,406 *** 0,417 ***
Number of observations 192.196 192.196 192.196 192.196 192.196
Number of firms 10.671 10.671 10.671 10.671 10.671
Number of events 633 633 633 633 633
Sector effects YES YES YES YES YES
QIC 7.677,2 7.716,4 7.724,8 7.722,8 7.721,9
QICu 7.669,2 7.710,5 7.719,2 7.717,8 7.717,5
Notes:  This table presents multiplicative hazard regression models for predicting binary default occurrences by firm specific 
variables. All variables have been lagged one year to allow for prediction one year out into the future. Data definitions and 
sources of the time series are given in Appendix 1. The full list of internal variables are included in model (1). Model (2) through 
(4) is shows the stepwise elimination, keeping only the most significant measure within the groups of (1) leverage,  (2) 
profitability, (3) liquidity and (4) collateralization. Model (5) (shaded grey) is the preferred baseline specification for firm 
specific variables. Significance level are represented by *= 10%, ** = 5% and ***= 1%. The significance levels are computed 
based on clustered standard errors using the PROC GENMOD GEE procedure in SAS.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
each step. The outcome is that interest bearing debt to total assets, net income to total assets, quick
ratio, and tangible assets (PPE) to total assets remain in the model, along with age of banking
relationship, log of total assets, and a negative equity dummy.
Interpreting the preferred model (Model 5 in Table 4) the effect of age is negative, implying
that the longer a firm has had a relationship with the bank, the less likely it is that the firm will
default. The effect of size, as measured by book assets, appears insignificant in the specification.
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appropriate to aggregate the predicted and observed number defaults in a given year – this is what is 
shown in panel (b). The conclusion is the same: The model based solely on firm specific variables is 
not capable of capturing the observed variation in defaults.19  
As discussed in the section of estimation methodology, the difference between the discrete Cox 
regression and a chosen hazard model is expected to be minor. However for completeness, both 
model (1) and (5) are, as specified, reported in Appendix 7 both using Cox regression and the 
logistic regression build into SAS. The differences between the models are virtually non-existing. 
 
Figure 10: Observed and predicted default based on firm specific model 
 
Notes: Panel (a) plots the number of defaults predicted defaults by the firm specific model against the observed number of defaults. 
Panel (b) is equivalent except that aggregation is done on a yearly basis. 
5.2 The role of Macroeconomic variables in explaining defaults 
Having concluded that firm specific variables are unable to explain the cyclical nature of corporate 
defaults this section attempts to incorporate macroeconomic effects. In order to assess if 
macroeconomic variables add explanatory power in explaining default, the preferred model of the 
firm-specific variables is included in the specifications below.  
 
Cf. Figure 4 in section 2, the expected effect of adding the macroeconomic variables may be 
thought to influence the default probability directly but also indirectly through firm characteristics. 
Focusing on the indirect effect through firm-specific variables, the inclusion of macroeconomic 
variables is thought to be able to influence e.g. firm’s earnings ability, in line with the model of 
                                                     
19 This conclusion may also be inferred by studying the explanatory variables medians and means through the 
observations period where only modest variations over time occur. (See Appendix 12). 
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Figur 3. Default prediction base on the preferr d Cox model only n luding accounting ratios. Panel (a)
shows the observed number of quarterly defaults in the sample along with the predicted number of defaults based on
the preferred Cox model only including accounting ratios (Model (5) in Table 4). Panel (b) is similar, except that the
aggregation is done on a yearly basis.
This might potentially be explained by the sample pertaining to only the largest corporate clients,
where size is less relevant as an explanation of default. The leverage ratio of interest bearing debt
to total assets is, as expected, positively related to default robability. Likewise, past profitability
is negatively related to default probability. The quick ratio enters with a significant negative sign
confirming the hypothesis that the more liquidity a firm has, the higher its ability to service unex-
pected cash shortfalls which would otherwise have resulted in a default. Tangible assets, measured
as Plant Property and Equipments (PPE) to total assets, does not appear to have a significant effect,
confirming the findings of Bonfim (2009) that tangible assets remain insignificant in explaining
corporate defaults. The negative (book) equity dummy enters with a positive sign in all specifica-
tions, confirming that negative (book) eq ity is in fact a sign of a firm n trouble and a increase
risk of default. The sign of the sectoral dummies are all positive and significant, confirming that
these sectors have above average default rates.
Using the results of Table 4, we calculate a predicted quarterly default intensity for each firm
in the sample, and then aggregate these to get a predicted aggregate intensity for each quarter.
Figure 3 shows the observed number of quarterly defaults in the sample along with the predicted
number of defaults based on the preferred Cox model only including accounting ratios. As evident
in panel (a), the model based on accounting ratios alone is unable to explain the cyclical nature of
the observed defaults. However, acknowledging that the firm-specific data can only change yearly
through annual financial statements, it may be more appropriate to aggregate the predicted and
observed number of defaults on a yearly basis. This is shown in panel (b), and the conclusion is
the same: The model based solely on firm-specific variables is not capable of capturing the cyclical
variation in defaults.
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Table 5. Estimation results for Cox models with both accounting- and macroeconomic variables. The table shows
parameter estimates, standard errors, and model summary statistics for Cox models of the quarterly default intensity
of firms in the sample. All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. The full list of firm-specific
and macroeconomic variables are included in model (6), and model (7) is the preferred specification after stepwise
elimination of variables. Model (8) is the preferred specification in Model (7) excluding the firm-specific variables.
Significance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Parameter significance is based
on standard errors clustered at the firm-level.
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index tend to be negatively linked to defaults illustrating the importance of demand side effects. 
Cap ci y utilization is also negatively associ ed with defau t occurrences meriting the 
interpretation that higher level of idle capacity could result in price competition that would 
ultimately lead a number of firms to default. 
Table 10: Including macroeconomic variables into the firm specific hazard model       
Dependent variable: Default (0/1) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef  Coef   Coef  
Intercept -13,341 *** -8,051 *** -7,206 *** 
Years active in the bank -0,011 *** -0,011 ***     
Log of total assets 0,007   0,007       
Interest bearing debt to total assets 1,232 *** 1,231 ***     
Net income to total assets -1,877 *** -1,877 ***     
Quick Ratio  -0,200 ** -0,200 **     
PPE to total assets 0,282 * 0,281 *     
Dummy for negative equity 0,592 *** 0,591 ***     
Aggregate quarterly number of Danish bankruptcies 0,005           
Danish Real GDP growth -0,027           
Export / GDP 9,633 *         
Inflation, pct point -0,124           
OMX stock market return -0,052 *** -0,045 *** -0,038 *** 
OMX stock market volatility -0,119 *** -0,101 *** -0,099 *** 
Difference CIBOR - policy rate, pct. Point 1,837 *** 2,006 *** 2,117 *** 
Yield curve slope 10y - 3m, pct. Point 0,986 *** 0,588 *** 0,634 *** 
Growth in house prices -0,114 *** -0,104 *** -0,115 *** 
Change in consumer confidence Indicator -0,110 *** -0,099 *** -0,110 *** 
Change in cyclical indicator, construction 0,002           
Change in capacity utilization in the industrial sector -0,338 *** -0,300 *** -0,292 *** 
Loan growth to non-financial institutions 0,023 **         
Stoxx50 stock market return 0,031 *** 0,034 *** 0,029 *** 
EU27 Real GDP growth 0,250 *** 0,227 *** 0,213 *** 
Number of observations 192.196   192.196   192.196   
Number of firms 10.671   10.671   10.671   
Number of events 633   633   633   
Sector effects YES   YES   YES   
QIC 7.513   7.513,6   8.265,0   
QICu 7.518   7.508,6   8.264,7   
Notes:  This table presents multiplicative hazard regression models for predicting binary default occurrences using both firm 
specific and macroeconomic variables. All variables have been lagged one year to allow for prediction one year out into the future. 
Data definitions and sources of the time series are given in Appendix X. Model 5 presents the full model with all macroeconomic 
variables included, where model 29 only presents the significant variables after stepwise elimination of insignificant variables in 
model 5. Model 31 includes only macroeconomic variables.  Significance level are represented by * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%. 
The significance levels are computed based on clustered standard errors using the PROC GENMOD GEE procedure in SAS.  
6.2 Including acr economic vari bles
Given that firm-specific variables are unable to explain the cyclical nature of defaults in our sample,
this section incorporates macroeconomic effects in our Cox model. In order to assess if macroeco-
nomic variables add explanatory power beyond what is implied by the firm-specific variables, the
18
preferred model of the firm-specific variables is used as the basis of the covariate specification.
Table 5 presents estimation results for Cox models incorporating macroeconomic variables.
The selection procedure has been to perform a stepwise elimination of insignificant variables until
only significant macroeconomic variables remain in the model. Model (7) is the preferred model
including both firm-specific and microeconomic variables, while Model (8) is this preferred model
excluding the firm-specific variables.
The effects of the firm-specific variables remain robust to the inclusion of the macroeconomic
variables. In the preferred model (Model (7) of Table 5), the significant macroeconomic variables
are as follows: The return of the OMX stock market index, the volatility of OMX index, the differ-
ence between CIBOR and the policy rate, slope of the yield curve, change in consumer confidence,
change in the capacity utilization, the return of the Stoxx 50 index, and, finally, the European GDP
growth rate. On the other hand, the aggregate number of defaults, the Danish real GDP growth,
exports as a fraction of GDP, inflation, changes in the cyclical indicator for construction, as well
as the loan growth to non-financials are all insignificant.
When interpreting the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables in multivariate intensity re-
gression models, one should bear in mind that it would be unrealistic to obtain a complete ceteris
paribus effect of one macroeconomic variable, as this variable cannot be viewed in isolation from
other macroeconomic variables. While not done here, an appropriate interpretation would involve
testing the model from the perspective of internally consistent scenarios of macroeconomic vari-
ables. For instance, a further analysis shows that the volatility of the stock market, the slope of the
yield curve, the return of the Stoxx 50 index, and the European GDP growth rate appear with an
opposite sign in the preferred model compared to a model where they enter separately.
Nonetheless, a positive return of the OMX stock market would, controlling for other macroe-
conomic effects, imply a lower number of default occurrences one year after. An increased spread
between CIBOR and the policy rate would be associated with an increased number of default oc-
currences, thereby supporting the notion that the higher funding costs of the banks would generally
be passed through to clients. Both growth in house prices and changes in the consumer confidence
index tend to be negatively linked to defaults, illustrating the importance of demand side effects.
Capacity utilization is also negatively associated with default occurrences, meriting the interpreta-
tion that higher level of idle capacity could result in price competition that would ultimately lead a
number of firms to default.
19
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the observed and predicted number of defaults
taking into account both the firm-specific variables and the macroeconomic variables in Model (7)
of Table 5. Adding macroeconomic variables as explanatory factors improves the model’s ability
to predict the cyclical variation in quarterly default occurrences. To rule out that the good fit of
the preferred model is merely a result of over-fitting, the out of sample prediction obtained from
estimating the same model on only part of the data supports the chosen model. Panel (b) and (c) of
the figure estimates the model on the sample excluding observations from 2010 and both 2010 and
2011 respectively. The obtained coefficients from the models estimated on the reduced samples
are then used to estimate the aggregate intensities for all 36 quarters, thereby generating out of
sample predictions. Hence, Panel (b) of the figure shows one and Panel (c) shows two years of
out of sample prediction. The out of sample prediction based on the reduced sample estimation
adequately captures both the level and cyclical variation in default rates.
Panel (d) of Figure 4 shows prediction based on excluding the years 2009, 2010 and 2011
from the estimation. For the out of sample prediction in Panel (d), large deviations occur in 2009
(which pertains to 2008 covariates observations because of the one year lag). However, it should
be emphasized that the latter model has been fitted to a period of economic expansion, and there-
fore it is of little surprise that the model cannot be used to predict future defaults in a period of
economic contraction. This finding also highlights the importance of estimating default predicting
occurrences on a full business cycle.
6.3 Ranking firms with respect to default likelihood
The out-of-sample estimation results presented in Figure 4 showed that the preferred Cox model
including both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables adequately captures the level and cycli-
cality of defaults. A common way of illustrating the predictive power of different models based
on the same data is to plot the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC), as shown in Figure 5. The curve
illustrates the percentage of defaults that are correctly classified as defaults on the vertical axis
against the percentage of non-defaults that are mistakenly classified as defaults on the horizontal
axis for all possible cutoff points. The area under the curve (AUC) is then used as measure of the
model goodness of fit where a value of 1.0 implies a model with perfect discriminatory ability and
a value of 0.5 is a completely random model.
In terms of discriminatory power, the addition of macroeconomic variables does not improve
the model’s ability to effectively determine which firms eventually default beyond what is implied
by the accounting ratios. From the ROC curves, we see that the model with both macroeconomic
and firm-specific variables is only marginally better in correctly determining defaults compared to
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Figure 5. Comparison of firm-ranking accuracy for different covariate-specifications. The figure shows receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves for Cox models with different covariate-specifications fitted to the sample.
Each curve illustrates the model’s ability to correctly discriminate between defaults and non-defaults, and plots the
percentage correctly classified defaults (true positives) against the percentage incorrectly classified non-defaults (false
positives) at all possible cut-off points of default intensity. The area under each curve serves as a goodness-of-fit
measure, where a value of 1 means a model with perfect discriminatory ability, while a value of 0.5 means a model
that discriminates based on a random guess.
the model with just firm-specific variables. This confirms that it is the firm-specific characteristics
that provide the ordinal ranking of firms, and therefore also ultimately determine which firms that
actually default. Including the macroeconomic factors only improves the model’s ability to capture
the cyclicality in the aggregate default rate, which is related to when defaults occur.
6.4 Allowing for time-varying effects of firm-specific variables
We now use the additive Aalen model to judge whether allowing for time-varying effects of firm-
specific variables changes our conclusions regarding which firm-specific and macroeconomic vari-
ables significantly affect default intensities.
We initially fit an additive model for our entire sample of firms, including the same covariate
specification as our final Cox model (Model (7) of Table 5), and with time-varying coefficients for
the firm-specific covariate. The null hypothesis of a time-constant marginal effect is rejected at
standard significance levels for the following four firm-specific variables: Firm-size (log of total
assets), interest bearing debt to total assets, quick ratio, and the construction sector indicator. The
time-varying marginal effects of these variables are shown as cumulative regression coefficients
with 95% pointwise confidence bands in Figure 6. When interpreting these effects, one should
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Figure 6. Cumulative regression coefficients from Aalen analysis of full sample. The panels show (cumulative)
estimation results for the significantly time-varying firm-specific covariates from an analysis based on the additive
Aalen model including the same covariate specification as our final Cox model (Model (7) of Table 5). All variables
are lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. The dotted lines are asymptotic 95% pointwise confidence bands.
focus on the slopes of the cumulative coefficients, which estimate the regression coefficients them-
selves. The plots show that smaller firms, firms with higher interest bearing debt to total assets,
firms with lower quick ratio, and firms within the construction sector have higher default proba-
bilities, and particularly so during the financial crisis of 2008-2010. Importantly, firm-size has a
mostly negligible marginal effect for most of our sample period (consistent with the results from
our analysis based on the Cox model), except for around the financial crisis of 08-10, where the
effect becomes significantly negative. Hence, contrary to the assumption in the Basel Accords, we
find that larger firms were safer, not riskier, during the most recent recession.
The estimation results for the time-constant regression coefficients from the additive model
fitted to the entire sample are given in Table 6. We see that all coefficients corresponding to firm-
specific variables have the same sign as in our final Cox model (Model (7) of Table 5) and roughly
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Table 6. Constant regression coefficients from Aalen analysis of full sample. The table shows the estimation results
for the time-constant regression coefficients for the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables from an analysis based
on the additive Aalen model including the same covariate specification as our final Cox model (Model (7) of Table 5).
All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. Significance of parameters is indicated at the 10%
(*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Parameter significance is based on robust standard errors.
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef Se
Intercept 0.0025 0.0407
Years active in the bank −2.05 × 10−5 *** 5.34 × 10−6
Net income to total assets −0.0140 *** 0.0017
PPE to total assets −0.0014 ** 0.0006
Dummy for negative equity 0.0078 *** 0.0012
Wholesale and retail trade, dummy 0.0005 0.0004
Manufacturing, dummy 0.0012 ** 0.0004
OMX stock market return −0.0036 ** 0.0016
OMX stock market volatility −0.0064 0.0080
Difference CIBOR - policy rate, pct. point 0.0059 0.0510
Yield curve slope 10y - 3m, pct. point 0.0110 0.0111
Growth in house prices −0.0006 0.0024
Change in consumer confidence indicator −0.0105 ** 0.0047
Change in capacity utilization −0.0077 0.0085
Stoxx50 stock market return 0.0042 *** 0.0012
EU27 Real GDP growth 0.0050 0.0077
the same significance level. The macroeconomic variables, however, appear to have lost much of
their importance compared to the analysis based on the Cox models. In the additive setting, only
OMX stock market return, change in consumer confidence indicator, and Stoxx50 stock market
return have significant marginal effects. The latter is of the reversed sign compared to intuition, but
is nonetheless consistent with results for public-firms found by Duffie et al. (2007); Duffie, Eckner,
Horel, and Saita (2009), Lando and Nielsen (2010), and Figlewski et al. (2012), amongst others.6
Importantly, we see that allowing for time-varying effects for firm-specific variables leaves little
room for additional explanatory power for macroeconomic variables. This is a consequence of
the fact that the time-variation in the effects shown in Figure 6 is highly correlated with indicators
of macroeconomic conditions, leaving little room for additional explanatory power of macroeco-
nomic variables.
In sum, the analysis based on the additive model suggests that allowing for time-variation in
the effects of firm-specific variables is, indeed, an important component of the cyclicality of default
probabilities that is missing from our preferred Cox model.
6Giesecke, Lando, and Medhat (2013) show that univariately significant but multivariately insignificant or even
reversed effects may be observed for macroeconomic variables if these have indirect effects mediated through other
covariates included in the models. This is in particular the case for stock market returns.
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Appendix 15: Default rates in small and large samples 
 
Figure A.15: Default rates for the large and small sample   
 
 
        
Notes: Figure A.15 shows default rate for two samples of firms, where the small firms are classified as 
small if, at the time of entry, their book value of assets is below the median book value of assets for that 
respective year. Correspondingly a large firm has asset value above the median at the time of entry. 
Default rate is number of defaulting firms divided by firms at risk of default 
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Figure 7. Aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large firms. This figure shows
the aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large firms. Based on the year a firm enters
the sample, it is lassified as “large” if its first-year asset lev l is above the median asset level that year. Similarly, a
firm is classifi d as “small” if its asset value at the time of entry is bel w the median asset level that year.
7 The macroeconomy’s impact on
small and large firms’ default risk
The results of the previous section show that our final Cox model specification including both
firm-specific and macroeconomic variables is able to both accurately rank firms and predict the
aggregate default rate over time. In this section, we first use this Cox model to investigate whether
our data supports the assumption underlying the Basel II and III Accords, that the default probabil-
ities of smaller firms are less impacted by the macroeconomy. We then redo our analysis using the
Aalen model, in order to judge whether allowing for time-varying effects of firm-specific variables
changes our conclusions.
Our tests examine the extent to which the default probabilities of small and large firms are
impacted differently by macroeconomic variables. To do so, we choose to we split the sample into
two subsamples, corresponding to “small” and “large” firms. Based on the year that a paticular firm
enters the sample, it is classified as “small” (“large”) if its first-year asset level is below (above)
the median asset level that year. We use assets instead of revenue as our measure of size because,
as discussed in Section 2.1, Danish reporting standards allow firms below a certain size to refrain
from reporting revenue. Note, however, that our use of asset level as the measure of size is in line
with Article 274 of The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (2006) report.7
Our choice to divide the sample based on the median asset level at a firm’s entry year is done
7The article’s wording is as follows: “Subject to national discretion, supervisors may allow banks, as a failsafe,
to substitute total assets of the consolidated group for total sales in calculating the SME threshold and the firm-size
adjustment. However, total assets should be used only when total sales are not a meaningful indicator of firm size.”
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to ensure approximately equal sample sizes with a sufficient amount of default events in each
subsample, as well as to allow for the classification of firms as “small” or “large” in a predicable
manner. However, we later show (in the section on robustness and model checks) that our results
are robust to a division into four subsamples based on asset value quartiles for the entry year.
Figure 7 shows the aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large
firms. The two default rates are seen to exhibit a high degree of comovement throughout our entire
sample period. In the beginning of our sample period, the two default rates are seen to be virtually
indistinguishable except for the spike in the default of large firms around 2005. However, near the
end of our sample period, the default rate of small firms tends to be systematically higher than the
default rate of large firms, indicating that small firms were hit the hardest by the financial crises of
2008-10.
7.1 Macro-sensitivity analysis based on the Cox model
Table 7 shows estimation results for the final Cox model specification including both firm-specific
and macroeconomic variables fitted to each of the two subsamples. With the exception of OMX
stock market volatility, the magnitude of all macroeconomic effects are larger for large firms com-
pared to small firms. The difference between the coefficients of macroeconomic factors for the two
subsamples is significant for the slope of the yield curve, growth in house prices, and European
GDP growth, and all are larger in magnitude in the subsample of large firms.8 Hence, if we sup-
pose there exists a large and a small firm whose only difference is their size (which is in principle
possible since all accounting ratios in our models are relative to total assets), the apparent interpre-
tation of these results is that the small firm’s default intensity is less exposed to macroeconomic
fluctuations.
On the other hand, the estimation results for the two subsamples also show substantial dif-
ferences with regards to the coefficients of the firm-specific variables: Firm size appears with a
significant positive coefficient for small firms, but an insignificant (yet negative) coefficient for
large firms; neither quick ratio nor the ratio of tangible assets to total assets have significant effects
for small firms, whereas they have significant effects for large firms; and, finally, negative equity
has a significant effect for small firms, but not for large.
8In an unreported analysis, we find that the importance of the European GDP growth for the large firms is merited
by the tendency of large firms in the sample to engage more actively in exports.
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While the results for the macroeconomic variables may corroborate the lower asset correlation
adopted in Basel II and III for SMEs, the direct comparison of coefficients in the two subsamples
ignores the fact that a covariate’s marginal effect in a non-linear model, like a Cox regression,
depends on the values of all the other covariates. This implies that comparing the coefficients
for the macroeconomic variables in the two subsamples is potentially problematic, because such
a comparison fails to take into account that the firm-specific characteristic for the small and large
firms are generally different and have different effects on default intensity.
To elaborate, note that the marginal effect in a Cox regression of a change in the jth macroeco-
nomic variable on the default intensity of firm i is given by
∂λ(Xit,Zt)
∂Z jt
= γ j Yit exp
(
β>Xit + γ>Zt
)
= γ j λ(Xit,Zt),
which depends on all the characteristics of firm i through Xit, as well as all other macroeconomic
variables through the dependence on Zt.
A somewhat crude way to facilitate comparison between subsamples in non-linear models, like
Cox regression, is to compute the marginal effect of a covariate at “average levels” in each of the
subsamples. This gives rise to the partial effect at the average (PEA) and the average partial effect
(APE)—see, for instance, Wooldridge (2009, p. 582-83). In the setting of an intensity model,
the PEA plugs a subsample’s average covariate values into the subsample’s estimated intensity,
while the APE takes the average across the estimated intensity values for each subsample. Due to
the non-linearity of the intensity, Jensen’s inequality implies that the two ways of averaging will
generally produce different results.
In our analysis, the PEA is a measure of a covariate’s marginal effect for the “average firm”
and at “average macroeconomic levels” in each of the two subsamples of small and large firms.
We thus compute the PEA for the jth macroeconomic variable in subsample k as
PEAk j = γk j exp
(
β̂kXk + γ̂
>
k Zk
)︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
=sPEAk
,
where k ∈ {small, large}, Xk is the average firm-specific covariate vector for firms in subsample
k, Zk is the average macroeconomic covariate vector in subsample k, β̂k and γ̂k are the estimated
regression coefficients in subsample k, while sPEAk is a subsample-specific scaling factor for each
PEA. On the other hand, the APE is a measure of a covariate’s marginal effect at the “average
intensity level” across firms and time in each of the two subsamples. The APE for the jth macroe-
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conomic variable in subsample k is thus computed as
APEk j = γk j
1
T
∫ T
0
1
|k(t)|
∑
i∈k(t)
exp
(
β̂
>
k Xit + γ̂
>
k Zt
)
dt︸                                             ︷︷                                             ︸
=sAPEk
,
where k(t) denotes the firms belonging to subsample k ∈ {small, large} at time t, and sAPEk is again
a subsample-specific scaling factor for each APE.
The two right-most columns of Table 7 show the PEAs and APEs for each covariate in each
of the two subsamples. Focusing on the effects of the macroeconomic variables, the PEA suggests
that most macro effects are, on average, stronger in the sample of small firms, while the APEs
suggest that it is entirely dependent on the macro variable at hand whether its average effect is
stronger for small or large firms.
In sum, while the direct comparison of regression coefficients indicates that smaller firms are
less cyclical than larger firms, the more refined analysis based on the PEA and APE, which takes
the non-linearity of the Cox model into account, indicates that small firms may “on average” be as
cyclical, or perhaps even more cyclical, than large firms. To rule out that this conclusion somehow
hinges on the Cox specification, we now investigate macro-sensitivity of default intensities using
an additive intensity regression model.
7.2 Macro-sensitivity analysis based on the additive Aalen model
Due to the linearity of its effects, the additive model allows us to directly compare the effects of
macroeconomic variables for small and large firms without the need for averaging techniques.
Recall that our specification of the additive model for the default intensity of firm i is given by
λ(Xit,Zt) = β(t)>Xit + γ>Zt.
It follows that the marginal effect of the jth firm-specific variable is given by
∂λ(Xit,Zt)
∂Xi j,t
= β j(t),
which is time-varying but otherwise independent of other variables and their effects. Similarly, the
marginal effect of the jth macroeconomic variable is
∂λ(Xit,Zt)
∂Z j,t
= γ j,
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Table 8. Constant regression coefficients from Aalen analysis of small and large firms. The table shows the
estimation results for the time-constant regression coefficients for the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables from
an analysis based on the additive Aalen model for the two subsamples of small and large firms. All variables are
lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. Significance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and
1% (***) levels. Parameter significance is based on robust standard errors.
Small firms Large firms
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef Se Coef Se
Intercept 0.0597 0.1883 0.0600 0.1918
Years active in the bank −1.83 × 10−5 * 1.14 × 10−5 −1.70 × 10−5 1.18 × 10−5
Net income to total assets −0.0160 *** 0.0025 −0.0168 *** 0.0025
PPE to total assets −0.0021 ** 0.0010 −0.0021 ** 0.0010
Dummy for negative equity 0.0082 *** 0.0016 0.0085 *** 0.0016
Wholesale and retail trade, dummy 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006
Manufacturing, dummy 0.0011 0.0007 0.0011 0.0007
OMX stock market return -0.0084 0.0066 −0.0135 * 0.0069
OMX stock market volatility 0.0192 0.0324 0.0089 0.0317
Difference CIBOR - policy rate, pct. point −0.3409 0.2317 −0.3048 0.2416
Yield curve slope 10y - 3m, pct. point 0.0003 0.0524 0.0134 0.0560
Growth in house prices 0.0136 0.0105 0.0098 0.0115
Change in consumer confidence indicator −0.0324 * 0.0191 −0.0283 * 0.0196
Change in capacity utilization −0.0625 0.0402 −0.0713 * 0.0404
Stoxx50 stock market return 0.0111 ** 0.0050 0.0146 ** 0.0054
EU27 Real GDP growth 0.0049 0.0351 0.0131 0.0370
which is time-constant, but again independent of other variables and their effects. Hence, in con-
trast to the multiplicative effects in the Cox model, the linear effects in the additive model are easy
to interpret and compare across subsamples without the need for averaging techniques. We will
therefore use the additive model to check the assumption that the default probabilities of smaller
firms are less sensitive to macroeconomic cycles.
We now re-do our macro-sensitivity analysis by fitting an additive model including the pre-
ferred firm-specific and macroeconomic variables to each of the two subsamples of small and large
firms. The definition of small and large firms is the same as for the subsample analysis based on
the Cox model in Section 4.1. Even though the macroeconomic variables did not have much ex-
planatory power in the additive model fitted to the entire sample, one could still imagine that some
macroeconomic variables had significant additive effects in the subsample of large firms, but not
in the subsample of small firms. This would be evidence that macro-dependence differs for small
and large firms, as is the working assumption in the Basel Accords.
Estimating the additive model in each of the two subsamples did not change the conclusions
regarding which firm-specific variables have significantly time-varying effects. Furthermore, the
time-varying effects within the two subsamples were virtually indistinguishable from their coun-
terparts for the full sample shown in Figure 6, and are therefore omitted here. In particular, in both
subsamples, firm-size has a mostly negligible marginal effect except during the financial crisis of
2008-2010, where larger firms (within each subsample) have significantly lower default probabili-
ties.
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With regards to the time-constant effects, Table 8 shows the estimation results for the time-
constant regression coefficients in the subsamples of small and large firms. As previously men-
tioned, the linearity of the additive model allows us to directly compare coefficients across sub-
samples without the need for averaging techniques. Doing so, we see no difference in sign and
virtually no difference in significance or magnitude in the two subsamples, and this is regardless
of whether we consider the firm-specific variables or the macroeconomic variables.
In conclusion, our subsample analysis based on the additive model shows no evidence that the
default probabilities of smaller firms are less sensitive to macroeconomic cycles. Our findings
based on the additive model thus generally reiterate the ones based on the Cox model, but they do
so in a framework that allows for cyclicality through the effects of firm-specific variables as well
as direct comparison of effects across subsamples.
8 Robustness and model check
In this section, we perform robustness checks and examine model fits. Because our main analysis
is based on the Cox model, we will focus on this model. However, the results presented here are in
general very similar when done based on the additive model.
8.1 Alternative criteria for defining small and large firms
In our analysis of small and large firms in Table 7, the criterion defining the two subsamples of
small and large firms was the median asset level of the year where a particular firm enters the
sample. We now investigate alternative criteria for defining the subsamples of small and large
firms and how they affect the effects of our variables within the two subsamples.
Table 9 shows estimation results for Cox models within subsamples of small and large firms,
where the subsamples are using defined different, time-varying size-criteria. All the models use the
covariate list corresponding to our preferred Cox model including both firm-specific and macroe-
conomic variables, i.e. Model (7) in Table 5.
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Models (A-1) and (A-2) show the estimation results when the full sample is divided into sub-
samples of small and a large firms According to the following criterion: A particular firm in a
particular year is classified as small (large) if the firm’s book asset value is below (above) the 25th
percentile of the full sample’s book asset values. This classification is time-varying in the sense
that the same firm can be classified as small in some years but large in other years. Similarly,
models (A-3) and (A-4) show the estimation results when a particular firm in a particular year is
classified as small (large) if the firm’s book asset value is below (above) the 50th percentile of the
full sample’s book asset values. Lastly, models models (A-5) and (A-6) show the estimation results
when a particular firm in a particular year is classified as small (large) if the firm’s book asset value
is below (above) the 75th percentile of the full sample’s book asset values.
A comparison of the estimation results within the three subsamples of small firms—i.e. models
(A-1), (A-3), and (A-5)—shows that the signs, magnitudes, and significance levels of the effects
of both the firm-specific and the macroeconomic variables remain largely unaltered as the size-
criterion defining the subsample of small firms increases. The only notable changes for the firm-
specific variables are for the size variable itself, which becomes smaller and insignificant as the
size-criterion defining a small firm increases, and for the manufacturing sector dummy, which
becomes larger and significant. The only notable changes for the macroeconomic variables are
for the slope of the yield curve and the change in capacity utilization, which gain magnitude and
significance as the size-criterion defining a small firm increases. Furthermore, a comparison of
models (A-1), (A-3), and (A-5) with the model for small firms in our main analysis in Table 7
shows that using a time-varying classification of small firms entails no material changes to the
signs, magnitudes, or significance levels of the effects of our variables within the subsamples of
small firms.
Similarly, a comparison of the estimation results within Table 9’s three subsamples of large
firms—i.e. models (A-2), (A-4), and (A-6)—shows that the signs, magnitudes, and significance
levels of the effects of both the firm-specific and the macroeconomic variables remain largely un-
altered as the size-criterion defining the subsample of small firms increases. Finally, a comparison
of models (A-2), (A-4), and (A-6) with the model for large firms in our main analysis in Table
7 shows that using a time-varying classification of large firms entails no material changes to the
signs, magnitudes, or significance levels of the effects of our variables within the subsamples of
large firms.
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8.2 Independent censoring and entry-pattern
Given that data is only available from 2003 onwards, the existing stock of firms entering the sample
in 2003 may potentially be of better average quality than the firms entering at a later point in
time. This bias would violate the assumption of independent censoring. To address this issue,
estimation was done on a reduced sample that excludes firms entering the sample in 2003 (where
a considerable part of these entries ties to the existing stock of the bank clients). The results (not
presented here, but available upon request) are that all estimated coefficients remain significant and
of the same sign as the final model (Model (7) in Table 5). To address the concern that the very low
number of entries in 2005 might have an impact on the results, the final model specification was
re-estimated using two samples: One that exclude entries from 2005, and another that excludes all
entries up until 2006. The estimates from these model fits (not presented here, but available upon
request) are still all significant and of the same sign as the model estimated on the full sample.
8.3 Lag length
We have throughout chosen to focus on a lag length of one year for the covariates employed in
our intensity models. One may, however, believe that for macroeconomic variables, this is not the
appropriate lag, as aggregate changes may take longer to impact firms. This may, for instance, be
because firms operate with a cash buffer that allow them to operate though an extended period of
time before a default is observed. To address this concern, we re-estimated the preferred model
with all macroeconomic variables lagged eight quarters instead of four. The results (not presented
here, but available upon request) showed that the macroeconomic variables are generally less able
to explain defaults when lagged eight quarters, as indicated by the loss in significance for most of
the coefficients.
Still, this analysis does not consider the possibility that different macroeconomic variables are
operating though different lag periods. Considering all possible combinations of lag periods would
result in an extensive number of permutations of the model for us to check. Instead, we constructed
a correlation matrix for the observed default rate and each of the macroeconomic time series lagged
from zero to eight quarters. It generally shows that, while the lag length of four quarters does not
provide the highest correlation with the default rate for all macroeconomic variables, it appears
that a unified lag period of four quarters is at least a very appropriate choice.
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sector ‘wholesale and retail trade’ sector along with the ‘transportation’ sector has the largest 
deviances, the model is re-estimated without these two sectors. The results do not change by 
performing this procedure and are presented in Appendix 17. 
Figure 13 (a): Cumulative residuals by sector   Figure 13 (b): Cumulative residuals by assets   
 
 
           
Notes: Figure 13 shows the cumulative residual process by sector (a) and asset size (b). Firms' sector stays the same over time, 
whereas the asset classification is done quarterly according to asset quartiles. A trending cumulative residual process for a given 
category is indication of model misspecification. 
 
Performing the same exercise based on asset quartiles yields panel (b) in Figure 13. Again no 
systematic effect is indentified by this visual inspection. However, it is noted that the largest 
quarterly deviances occur in the largest and smallest quartiles. This point further motivates the 
ambitions of previous section to appropriately take into account the size of a firm when developing 
models for the default of firms. 
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Figure 8. Model check based on grouped martingale residual processes. The figure shows cumulative martingale
residual processes for the preferred Cox model including bo h firm-specific a d macroeconomic variable (Model (7)
in Table 5). In the left panel, grouping corresponds to each firm’s sector, which is stationary across the sample period,
while in the right panel, the grouping is time-varying and done According to asset quartiles.
8.4 Grouped martingale residual processes
We check the fit of our final model using the martingales residual processes (2). Specifically, we
consider to what extent the model is systematically over-or underestimating the default frequency
in different sectors and size-groups.
By definition, the martingale residual processes are the difference between the observed de-
fault frequency and the default frequency predicted by the model. Since a single firm can at most
have one default event in our estimation setup, the firm-specific processes contain too little in-
formation. However, when grouped in sufficiently large clusters, the increments of the grouped
processes should not be systematically positive or negative if the model fit is adequate. An in-
creasing grouped residual process would imply that the model is under-predicting the number of
defaults this particular group, whereas a decreasing grouped residual process would imply that the
model is predicting too many defaults for this group.
The left panel of Figure 8 shows grouped residual processes by sector as a function of time. We
see that the residual processes fluctuate around zero with both positive and negative increments for
all sectors. This is support for the model performing equally well for all sectors. However, noting
that the sectors “wholesale and retail trade” and “transportation” have the largest deviances, we
re-estimated our final model excluding firms in these two sectors – the results (not presented here,
but available upon request) do not change.
The right panel of the figure shows grouped residual processes by asset quartiles as a function
of time. We again observe no truly systematic deviations. We note, however, that the largest
quarterly deviances occur in the largest and smallest quartiles, further motivating the point that
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default prediction models should take firm size into account.
9 Conclusion
The Basel II and III Accords impose smaller capital charges on bank loans to SMEs by assuming a
lower correlation in the formula for unexpected loss in a loan portfolio. The reduction in correlation
for SMEs corresponds to an assumption that these firms have default probabilities that are less
sensitive to the economy-wide factor. This paper investigates whether there is empirical support
for this assumption. Using a default intensity regression framework, our results indicate that solely
discriminating with respect to firm-size, the default probabilities of small firms do in fact exhibit
less sensitivity to macroeconomic cyclicality compared to the default probabilities of large firms,
in the sense that the effects of macroeconomic variables are of smaller magnitude for smaller
firms. However, when we account for differences in firm-characteristics other than size, our results
indicate that the default probability of the average small firm is as cyclical or even more cyclical
than the default probability of the average large firm. The results are robust to different regression
models and different divisions of our sample into small and large firms. Our findings suggest that
a reduction in capital charges based solely on firm-size may imply a higher risk for banks with a
high exposure to the SME-segment.
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